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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH and
JUDY E. BODILY,
. Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vCase No. 14386
JOSEPH EVAN BODILY,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The Plaintiffs-Appellants, State of Utah, and Judy
E. Bodily appeal from an order on an order to show cause holding
that child support assigned to the State of Utah by a welfare
recipient is dischargeable in bankruptcy.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .'...The Appellants brought an Order to Show Cause against
the Respondent for a judgment of back child support assigned to
the State of Utah by a welfare recipient.

As a defense thereto,

the Respondent presented that said debt was included in a bankruptcy petition and was therefore discharged at the completion of
the bankruptcy proceedings.
The lower court held that that child support assigned
to the State was dischargeable in bankruptcy.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's
order and memorandum decision which hold that assigned child
support debts are dischargeable and seek that this case be
remanded for a judgment of the entire amount claimed owed under
the bankruptcy petition as well as the judgment granted by
the court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Judy Bodily, divorced the defendant,
Joseph E. Bodily, on July 13, 1973.

The court ordered the

defendant to pay $40.00 per month child support for two children
from July, 1973 until January, 1974.

In January, 1974 support

was increased to $60.00 per month per child.
In June, 1974 the defendant filed bankruptcy.

The

defendant listed the arrearage for child support as being a
dischargeable debt but did not notify the State of Utah, as a
creditor, of the petition for bankruptcy.

The State was a valid

creditor because Mrs. Bodily was on public assistance from July,
1973 until the time of the order to show cause here involved.
The defendant was discharged in bankruptcy on March 14, 1975.
Between July, 1973 and January, 1975 the defendant had accumulated
an arrearage of $2,595.00 for unpaid child support.

The defendant

only paid $45.00 in support to the Clerk of the Court during that
time period.
•

The State of Utah filed an Order to Show Cause against
the defendant in June, 1975 to obtain judgment for the arrearages
of $2,595.00.

The defendant contends that the State is barred from
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"(a) A d i s c h a r g e i n b a n k r u p t c y s h a l l r e l e a s e
a b a n k r u p t from all o f h i s p r o v a b l e d e b t s , whetlv
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to the p e r s o n o r p r o p e r t y o f a n o t h e r , f o r
a l i m o n y d u e o r t o b e c o m e du€^, o r for m a i n t e n a n c e
or s u p p o r t o f w i f e o r c h i l d . " (Emphasis a d d e d ) .
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Act
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except such as are for alimony due or to
become due, or for maintenance or support
of wife or child."
As early as 1901, the United States Supreme Court
held in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 21 S.Ct. 735, 45 L.Ed,
1009 (1901) that a claim for alimony due to a divorced wife is
not a debt within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 35, and on that
ground as well as under the express provision of that section is
not released by the bankrupt's discharge.

Immediately following

this decision, the Supreme Court entertained the question of child
support.

In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 23 S.Ct. 757, 47 L.Ed.

1084, the court held that a voluntary agreement to support children
was non-dischargeable.
Since the afore-mentioned cases, numerous decisions
have been handed down from circuit courts, district courts, and
bankruptcy courts implementing these holdings of the U. S. Supreme
Court.

Through statutes, rules, and court decisions the non-

dischargeability of support debts for children and wives has been
upheld.
Perhaps the case of Fernandes v. Pitta, 47 C.A. 2d
248, 117 P.2d 728, a California state court case, presents the
reason for these laws.

In essence, the holding is the following

though not a direct quote from the case:
The rule that liability for support of wife
or children, even though reduced to judgment is
not provable in a bankruptcy proceeding, so as
to release bankrupt from liability, is based on
public policy to place obligations of support of
wife or children on husband or parents so as to
relieve society of those burdens.

The Utah Supreme Court has also entertained this issue,
though

indirectly.

Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 43 6, 4 91 P.2d 231

(1971) contains the following language and footnote.
"In order to carry out the important
responsibility of safeguarding the interests
and welfare of children, it has always been
deemed that the courts have broad equitable
powers. To accept the plaintiff's contention
that an adjudged arrearage is tantamount to a
judgment in law, would in the long run tend
to impair rather than to enhance the abilities
of both the plaintiff and the court to accomplish
the desired objective... For the foregoing reasons
decrees and orders in divorce proceedings are
of a different and higher character than judgments in suits at law; and by their nature are
better suited to the purpose of protecting the
interests and welfare of children.2"
***

[Footnote]
"3 In addition to enforcement by the court's
equitable powers, they are not dischargeable
in Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 35."
Thus, it is clearly seen that the Utah Supreme.
Court also recognizes the holdings presented in this argument.
This gives support to the oft held position, that State courts
must give credence to Federal decisions which pre-empt State law.
Therefore, child support payments are non-dischargeable
in Bankruptcy proceedings.
POINT II
WHETHER THE PERSON TO RECEIVE THE SUPPORT
PAYMENTS IS A STATE AGENCY UNDER THE PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OR THE NATURAL PARENT
MAKES NO DIFFERENCE AS TO DISCHARGEABILITY,
The question now raised by this appeal is whether support
assigned to the State of Utah retains its character as "child

support" and thus is non-dischargeable as well.

Referring once

again to Judge Gould's Memorandum Decision (R-48) the statement
is made that the intention of Congress was to make the debt to
a public agency dischargeable.
Appellants feel that the lower court did not recognize
the important difference between support for children specifically
exempted and other debts.

It is Appellants position, that an

assignment to receive said payments from the obligor does not
work a difference on the nature of said payments but that they
retain their character as support payments if they are received
by the State.
About the time of the filing of the Respondent's petition
in bankruptcy, Congress enacted the Social Security Amendments
of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
1974) which spelled out in plain language the position of Congress
on this issue. As a part of those amendments, 42 U.S.C. §460 (c) (5)
provides that each applicant under the AFDC program (Aid to Families
with Dependent Children), as a condition of eligibility therefore,
"...assign to the State any rights to support
from any other person such applicant may have
(1) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other
family member for whom the applicant is applying
for or receiving aid, and (ii) which have accrued
at the time such assignment is executed..."
Further, 42 U.S.C. 456 (b) states:
"[a] debt which is a child support obligation
assigned to a State under [42 U.S.C. §602 (a)(26)]
is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy under
the Bankruptcy Act." (Emphasis added).

The recent decision from the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, In the Matter of Johnnie Williams,
whose wife is Mytris Gene Williams, vs. Department of Social
and Health Services, State of Washington,

F.2d

, decided

January 20, 1976 (9th Circuit, 1976) makes the following holding
regarding the application of 42 U.S.C. 456 (b) above:
"Althoughthis amendment, effective July 1,
197 5, should control future actions under state
statutes seeking to collect accrued unpaid
child support, it is not dispositive of this
appeal. However, the decision we reach is in accord
with and may properly take cognizance of this
recent declaration of Congressional intent, Cf,
Wetmore v, Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 76-77, 25 S.Ct.
172, 175 (1904), For we hold that the recoupment
debt created by RCW 74,20A, 010 et, seq, is a debt
for maintenance or support exempt from discharge
in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §35 (a)(7).
(Emphasis added.)
The above Washington case was, as here, filed and
decided before the new amendments officially went into effect.
But not only did the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals hold that amounts
owed prior to the effective date of the above amendment owed to
the Department of Social and Health Services were non-dischargeable,
but the amendment is dispositive of all future situations. Here,
in Utah, the District Bankruptcy Court made the same determination
on February 14, 1975 in In re Riley.

A copy of this decision is a

part of the record between Pages R-37 and R-38.
Appellants feel that Respondent purposely misled the
state district court in its interpretation of In re Riley which this
office prosecuted before Bruce Jenkins, Judge of the Bankruptcy

Court.

Therefore, an explanation is in order.
In Riley, id., the husband and wife separated

for approximately 21 months.

During that time, Mr. Riley did

not support his wife or child in any manner.

There was no

temporary support orders and no divorce action was instituted.
The Rileys later reconciled, and filed a joint bankruptcy petition.
Because there was no support order from a court of
law, Judge Jenkins was required to apply Utah law in determining
Mr. Riley's support obligation for the 21 month period.

He

turned to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7 1953 (as amended) which sets
forth certain criteria in determining actual liability for support.
Though the State feels U.C.A. §78-45-7 is for prospective payments
only from the date of a hearing on the matter, Judge Jenkins applied
those criteria for the 21 month period in question to see what
Mr.Riley's child support obligation and liability was under Utah law.
He held that of the $2,900.00 expended by the Utah State Department
of Social Services, only $700.00 could be considered support for the
wife and child as per his obligation.

The difference between the

$700.00 and $2,900.00 was solely an overexpenditure by the Department
as per its own regulations having nothing to do with Mr. Riley's
support obligation.
For example, a grant for two people under the "welfare"
program is $199.00.

However, a court might order $75.00 per month

child support and $50.00 per month wife support.

Thus, the
(

difference between the $199.00 and the $125.00 as ordered by the

the court is an overpayment not charged to an absent father.
Therefore, Respondent's statement that Judge Jenkins
penned figure of $700.00 means that some of the child support
money is dischargeable and some isn't is a fallacious reading of
the entire matter.

Thus, the language of the order states as cited

in Respondent's memorandum

(R-32):

"That it be ordered that the debt created
by Kathleen G. Riley's receipt of AFDC
assistance to the extent of $7 00.00 is a nondischargeable debt in Bankruptcy under Sec. 17
(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act."
Thus, the court's order did not hold, as Respondents
claim, that all of the assistance given Mr. Riley's family was
"child support", but that under Utah law only $700.00 of the total
assistance was Mr. Riley's liability and obligation.
support liability was termed "non-dischargeable."

That child

The criteria

used to determine the amount owed, as alluded to previously
is U.C.A. §78-45-7:
"When determining the amount due for
support the court shall consider all revelant
factors including but not limited to:
(1) the standard of living and situation of
the parties;
(2) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(3) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(4) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(5) the need of the obligee;
(6) the age of the parties;
(7) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others."
The present case involves a court order under a divorce
decree.

The above seven criteria are not needed in determining

the amount owed because of the court ordered support payments
as indicated in the divorce decree (R.22).

The entire amount claimed

in Appellant's Order to Show Cause was a sum certain determined
from the court order.

Therefore, as per the Federal law, that

entire amount is non-dischargeable.
Not only does Federal law compel the above conclusion,
but the State of Utah has enacted U.C.A. §55-15-32 confirming
that belief.

It states as follows:
"Public assistance provided under this
act shall not be assignable, at law or in
equity, and none of the money paid or payable
under this act shall be subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy
or insolvency law." (Emphasis added).

Though Respondents attempt to belittle the enactment
of this provision as "in contravention of Federal law" and thus
void, Appellants point out that when state laws are in harmony
with Federal laws the state laws should stand.

In the present case,

Federal statutes and decisions uphold the position expressed in
U.C.A. §55-15-32. Therefore, this court should give credence to
the intent, purpose, and meaning of it in determining this appeal.
Further language of the 9th Circuit decision Williams,
supra, points out the flaw in Respondent's position:
"The bankrupt and the opinion of the Referee
in Bankruptcy adopted by the district court argue
essentially that the State of Washington has
attempted to invest itself with the character and
quality of the childrens1 relationship to the
bankrupt by "statutory fiat," and that the true
origin of the recoupment debt is the independant
obligation of the Department to provide AFDC payments
to all eligible individuals rather than the bankrupt's obligation to provide support...
* * *

W* disagree. A debt's underlying nature, rather
than its form, is the~central concern in determining

whether it is discharged. Cf. Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295, 305-06, 60 S.Ct. 238, 244-45 (1939);
Martin v. Rosenbaum, 329 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir.
1964); Poolsman v. Poolsman, supra. The Department's
duty to provide $1,864.80 in AFDC funds for the
support of the bankrupt's minor children did not
arise in a vacuum. 42 U.S.C. §602 (a)(7) requires
state agencies determining need and eligibility
for AFDC support to
11
. . .take into consideration any other
income and resources of any child or .
relative claiming aid to families
with dependent children..."
Had the bankrupt met his common law and statutory
support obligation reflected in the divorce court's
support order, the need of his offspring and the
level of AFDC payments which the Department was
obligated to make to those dependents would have
been correspondingly reduced. See King v. Smith,
supra, at 319-20, 88 S.Ct. at 2134-35. Therefore,
the Departments1 payments, while mandated by
statute and regulations, were substantially in lieu
of the bankrupt's support obligations.
The fact that the funds recovered flow to state
and federal treasuries -^ rather than directly to
the bankrupt's children does not alter their
character as obligations for maintenance or support.
Under RCW 7 4.20A 03 0 the Department is "subrogated"
to the welfare recipient's right to support. That
doctrine of subrogation results in a "...shift of
the original debt from the creditor to the [subrogee]
who steps into the creditor's shoes." Putnam v.
Commissioner of Interal Revenue, 3 52 U.S. 82, 85
77 S.Ct. 175, 176 (1956). E.g., Compania Anonima
Venezolana de Nav. v. A.J. Perez Exp. Co., 313 F.2d
692, 696 (5th Cir. 1962); Allen v. See, 196 F.2d
608, 610 (10th Cir. 1952). As such, the debt to
the Department is not a debt different than the
bankrupt's obligation to his dependents although
it is payable to a different party.
"k "k "k

We hold, therefore, that RCW 74.20A 010 et. seq.'s
recoupment debt is essentially an obligation for
maintenance or support exempt from discharge in

bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §35(a)(7). The
judgment of the district court requiring
repayment of $3 97,81 to the bankrupt and
enjoining further attempts to enforce the
debt for the balance of the child support
arrearages outstanding is reversed, and
the trial court is directed to enter judgment
in accordance with this opinion.11
(Emphasis added).
Utah Code Annotated §55-15-32 states exactly the same
as the above,in meaning.

Though the Williams case, supra, involves

a direct appeal from the district and bankruptcy courts, the
question determined is the same as that arising in this instant
case.
CONCLUSION
Congressional intent in enacting 42 U.S.C. 656,
Utah Bankruptcy Court's decision of In re Riley, as well as
Williams, supra, and Utah's acknowledgment of Federal law in Harmon,
supra, urge this court to reverse the district court's order and to
remand for judgment of the proper amount•
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Utah Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
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